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In this paper it is shown that allowing the deduction of work-related expenses has a strictly 
positive effect on tax efficiency only if two conditions hold jointly: (i) The expenses should 
be interpretable as real cost and (ii) the expenses should be required for increasing taxable 
income. Otherwise deductions are inefficient, neutral or ambiguous. Thus it is argued that the 
cost of commuting to work should not be deductible as commuting does not increase taxable 
income. The efficiency enhancing effect of deducting other expenses like educational ones or 
expenses for housework and child care is challenged on the grounds that these expenses are 
largely pecuniary costs. 
JEL Code: H21, H24. 
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This is the revision of a very preliminary version that has been presented at the 60th Congress 
of the IIPF 2004 in Milan under the title “Efficient, Inefficient and Neutral Tax Deductions 
for Work-Related Expenses”. The revision has benefited from valuable suggestions made by 
various participants, Stefan Homburg and two anonymous referees.   2
 
1. Introduction 
The principle seems to be so self evident that it is hardly ever questioned. The 
principle suggests that income should only be taxed to the extent that it exceeds the 
expenses incurred by earning the income. In other words, earnings-related expenses 
should be tax deductible. The principle is well founded when applied to business 
expenses. By deducting all costs of business activity from revenues net income 
obtained equals profit. A tax on pure profit is ideal in so far as it generates revenue 
without deadweight loss and as it is considered to serve the equity objective. The case 
is less clear, however, with work-related expenses. The disutility of labor not being 
deductible the question naturally arise why and which other costs should be 
deductible. This paper tries to shed light on this basic question of income taxation. 
And it does so in an optimal taxation framework. 
The question of optimal deductibility strongly suggests itself when studying the 
practice of allowing the deduction of specific expenses. Even if consideration is 
restricted to the practice of single countries, peculiarities and inconsistencies are 
striking. Baldry (1998, p. 48) reports about Australia that expenses for education are 
deductible if they can lead to promotion and increased salary in the taxpayer’s existing 
employment but that they are not deductible if they allow the taxpayer to enter a new 
and even a higher-paying occupation. He finds such practice arbitrary and 
contradictory and he mentions other provisions of similar dubiousness.
2 Even greater 
peculiarities and inconsistencies can be identified in cross-country comparisons of 
                                              
2 According to Due (1977, p. 41-42) similar peculiarities are characteristic of U.S. tax law.    3
taxation. The most striking example is the treatment of commuting expenses. For some 
countries they are considered to be deductible expenses while for others they are not 
(Wrede, 2001, p. 80). The United States and the United Kingdom are prominent 
examples treating traveling expenses to work as not deductible items. Other countries, 
notably Germany and the Scandinavian countries, allow taxpayers to deduct 
commuting expenses from earned income. Such opposing practice provokes the 
question of which rule is optimal in any well defined sense. 
Although there exist interesting attempts to derive rigorous answers to this question 
the state of discussion is anything but satisfactory. This becomes apparent just by 
comparing the contributions of Baldry (1998) and Wrede (2001). The former 
concludes that “on balance, there is a strong case against employee tax-deductibility of 
wage-related expenses on both efficiency and equity grounds” whereas the latter 
derives the result that commuting expenses should be deductible by more than one 
hundred percent given certain assumptions concerning mobility and taxation. This 
striking contradiction less raises the question of who is right or wrong but more of 
when do wage-related expenses qualify for deductibility and when do they not? This 
paper aims at shedding light on this question. It is shown that allowing the deduction 
of work-related expenses has a strictly positive effect on tax efficiency only if two 
conditions hold jointly: (i) The expenses should be interpretable as real cost and (ii) 
the expenses should be required for increasing taxable income. As the latter is being 
disputed in the case of commuting this paper pleads for denying deduction. Even 
partial deductibion violates tax efficiency. Hence deductions for commuting are an 
example of inefficient ones. Deductible expenses should also be interpretable as real 
cost and not only as some pecuniary cost. Otherwise deductibility has either no effect   4
on tax efficiency or an ambiguous one. In this paper it is argued that deductions for 
educational expenses or expenses for housework and child care provide examples for 
deductions the efficiency effect of which is either neutral or ambiguous.  
Such results are apt to stir controversy. In the past, various prominent German 
economists have strongly defended the practice of allowing commuting expenses to be 
(partially) deducted form earned income (Krause-Junk, 1996; Sinn, 2003). Equally, 
there are prominent textbooks stressing the efficiency enhancing effect of allowing the 
deduction of dependent-care expenses (Stiglitz, 1986, p. 435). Below it is argued that 
Stiglitz fails to convince when the fact is acknowledged that dependent-care expenses 
are largely pecuniary costs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a scenario in which the 
efficiency enhancing effect of tax deductions for wage-related expenses is 
indisputable. Section 3 assumes that the expenses are not required to increase taxable 
income. Hence deductibility is shown to be inefficient even if granted only partially.
3 
Sections 4 to 7 analyze expenses that are pecuniary costs. It is shown that the 
efficiency effect of allowing deduction is either neutral (Sections 4, 6 and 7) or 
ambiguous (Section 5). Section 4 assumes occupational choice to be exogenous while 
it is endogenous in the following Sections 5 to 7. In Section 5 the taxpayer can engage 
in two parallel activities one of which requires the employment of a housekeeper. In 
Section 6 the taxpayer can choose between employing or becoming a housekeeper. In 
Section 7 it is shown that allowing deduction of tuition fees that compensate for pure 
labor cost do not affect tax efficiency if pure profit generated by educational choice 
does not accrue to the private sector. Section 8 summarizes. The paper does not go into   5
informational issues. These have been the major focus of related recent literature. See 
Baldry (1998) and Baake et al. (2004) who raise the question of how to tax work-
related expenses when they serve both production and consumption and when the 
government is unable to monitor their use. 
 
2. Efficient deductions 
The paper’s focus is on efficiency. Hence the model of a representative individual is 
adopted. The individual has to choose between two time consuming activities. One is 
ordinary labor, L, and the other one is some qualified service, S, for which there is 
separate demand in the market. Both activities cause disutility, V(L+S), with positive 
and increasing increments, V’, V” > 0, and both earn taxable income at wage rates 
which are denoted by  L w  and  S w , respectively. Other than labor the provision of 
services induces expenses, cS, which, for the pure sake of simplicity, shall be 
proportional in the service quantity. All sources of wage income are uniformly taxed at 
a proportional rate, t. Throughout the paper the tax rate is assumed to be positive, t > 0. 
The question is to what extent expenses required for providing services should be 
deductible. Let a denote the rate at which deductibility is allowed. a = 1 stands for full 
deductibility and 0 < a < 1 for partial deductibility. 
Given this highly stylized model the individual will maximize  
  ) ( ) 1 ( ] )[ 1 ( S L V cS at S w L w t S L + − − − + −   in  L, S  .     (1) 
                                                                                                                                             
3 Sections 2 and 3 draw on Richter (2004).   6
Labor and services are demanded by an employer maximizing profit, 
S w L w K S L F S L − − ) , , ( . The production function, F, is assumed to have standard 
properties: constant returns to scale in all three factors, positive partial derivatives,  i F , 
negative second derivatives,  ii F , and non-negative cross derivatives,  ij F , 
K S L j i , , , = . K is some hidden fixed factor generating pure profit. After substituting 
marginal products for market wage rates the first-order conditions of (1) are written as 
  c at F t V F t S L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( − − − = = −   .       (2) 
A benevolent tax planner will maximize social surplus, 
  ) ( ) , ( S L V cS S L F + − −          ( 3 )  
in  a t S L , , ,  subject to the behavioral constraint (2) and the tax revenue constraint 
  ] [ acS SF LF t S L − +     =    constant.        (4) 
As expenses cS enter (3) they have to be interpreted as real cost. This contrasts with 
later sections in which pecuniary costs are modeled. The planner’s optimization is 
easily solved by standard Lagrangean technique. See Appendix. One obtains the 
following elasticity rule as first-order condition: 
 






















  .     (5) 
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' / " ) ( V V S L + = ν   is the elasticity of marginal disutility whereas 
KS S L S KF SF LF F
dS
d
= − − = ] [ Π ,  and   L Π   are the marginal increases of pure profit 
with respect to S and L, respectively. 
In order to interpret (5) start by looking at the special case when returns to scale are 
constant in L and S. In this particular case of vanishing pure profit the RHS of (5) 
equals one and  c F F S L − =  results from (5). Interpret  c F F S L − =  as condition of 
production efficiency. It is the first-order condition obtained when maximizing net 
production,  cS K S L F − ) , , ( , subject to  ) ( ' S L V +  = constant  S L + ⇔  = constant. 
Note that production efficiency is compatible with the behavioral constraints (2) only 
if full deduction, a=1, is allowed.  
 
Corollary 1: If returns to scale are constant in L and S, efficient taxation requires full 
deduction, a=1, of the cost, cS, incurred by providing taxable services. 
 
Things are less clear in the case of non-constant returns to scale. In this case the RHS 
of (5) can be smaller or even larger than one. It is larger if, and only if, pure profit 
more strongly increases with a marginal increase in S than it would increase with a 
marginal increase in L,  L S Π Π > . By (2), the LHS of (5) is larger than one if, and 
only if, less than full deductibility is granted, a<1. Putting pieces together yields 
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Corollary 2: If pure profit more strongly reacts to S than to L, it is efficient to grant 
partial deduction, a<1, only. Vice versa, the efficient degree of deduction 
exceeds one if  L S Π Π < . 
 
Proposition 1 and its Corollaries are best understood if related to the Production 
Efficiency Theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). According to this theorem it is 
first-best to tax pure profit and given that all pure profit is fully taxed away or does not 
exist it is second-best to ensure production efficiency. If pure profit exists that, by 
assumption, is not taxable, it may be third-best to violate production efficiency. In this 
case it is efficient to tax those factors more heavily than others that have the stronger 
positive effect on profit. The rationale is that taxation should not induce substitution 
effects that generate non-taxable pure profit. This insight also explains the result of 
Wrede (2000). In this paper partial deductibility is shown to be efficient in a model in 
which an activity, interpreted as commuting, generates non-taxable pure profit. 
Corollary 2 allows one to trace back the question of efficient deductibion to the 
question of which factors of production have the stronger effect on non-taxable pure 
profit. If this question cannot be answered empirically, it may be good policy not to 
differentiate at all. This pragmatic approach to taxation suggests to postulate a value of 
one for the RHS of (5) and to secure production efficiency by granting full 
deductibion, a=1. 
   9
3. Inefficient deductions 
Keep the setup as introduced in Section 2 and replace S by some activity D which does 
not earn taxable income. Commuting provides an example in point. It consumes time, 
is no leisure activity and does not earn taxable wage income. The latter may not be 
obvious and therefore needs some discussion. 
Traveling to work is clearly related to work in some descriptive sense. However, one 
cannot reasonably assume that in the absence of taxation employers would be willing 
to pay for commuting. It simply does not help to increase revenues. As a rule, 
employers should therefore have no demand for commuting. Now assume that the cost 
of commuting, cD, is proportional in travelling time D which by way of normalizing 
units of measurement can be equally interpreted as distance. Like labor, commuting 
provides disutility, V(L+D). Because of this disutility it would not be appropriate to 
call commuting expenses cD “consumptive” and to contrast them with the 
“productive” expenses cS caused by providing taxable services . 
Commuting must generate gains however. Otherwise nobody would incur direct 
expenses and disutility. Let H(D) denote the gain from commuting. One my think of 
private savings in the cost of housing. It is reasonable to assume such savings as work 
places tend to be agglomerated and as prices of housing decline with an increasing 
distance to agglomerations. Let H’ > 0 > H” and assume that the gains from 
commuting are not taxable. This is a key assumption. One could argue instead that the 
gains are taxed as most countries have a tax on housing property. However, in a 
Tiebout world perfect mobility of households induces local jurisdictions to use the 
property tax as an instrument to internalize the marginal cost of congestion induced by   10
the consumption of non-excludable local public goods (Hoyt, 1991). Hence it is a 
reasonable modeling strategy to abstract from these costs of congestion and from any 
local tax on housing. On the other hand, the practice of various European countries 
equally suggests to let commuting expenses be deductible at some rate a from the 
wage tax. It will be demonstrated below that any non-negativity of a harms tax 
efficiency. To get the result look at the individual’s problem of allocating non-leisure 
time to the competing uses L and D: 
 max  { ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( D L V cD at D H L w t L + − − − + − }  in  L, D  .    (6) 
After substituting  L F  for  L w  the first-order conditions are written as 
  c at H V F t L ) 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( − − = = −   .        ( 7 )  
A benevolent tax planner will maximize social surplus, 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( D L V cD D H L F + − − +         ( 8 )  
in  a t D L , , ,  subject to the behavioral constraints (7) and the tax revenue constraint 
  ] [ acD LF t L −     =     c o n s t a n t .          ( 9 )  
It is straightforward to demonstrate that a<0 holds in the optimum. See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2: Allowing non-negative deductibility of commuting expenses cD 
violates second-best efficiency of taxation.  
 
For understanding this result it is best to start from a scenario with a = 0 < t. The first-
order conditions of the household maximization can then be written as   11
c H V F t L − = = − ' ' ) 1 (  . From the perspective of efficiency the level of labor is too low 
while the choice of commuting is optimal. When starting from this situation the 
marginal variation of a does not affect the social surplus generated by commuting. 
Hence it increases tax efficiency if a is marginally reduced below zero and if the 
generated revenue is used to reduce the wage tax t. The gain from such a tax reform is 
of first order while the cost is one of second order. That explains why a<0 must hold in 
the optimum. It is simply not efficient to tax the use of non-leisure time if it earns 
income and not to tax it if it saves costs on housing. 
The result has to be related to the literature. There are well-known first-best arguments 
for taxing commuting. The most prominent ones rely on the objective to internalize the 
external costs of environmental damage and traffic jam. Whether fighting urban sprawl 
requires corrective interventions in transport markets is a more debatable subject. 
Brueckner (2003) argues against the need for correction. Wrede (2001) provides an 
argument for subsidization. However, one may argue that Wrede’s result is biased by 
equity considerations. He compares households that only differ by the fact that some 
commute while others not. He then studies the policy of securing equal utility to both 
households. Given this institutional constraint it is obvious that there must be 
compensation for the leisure cost of commuting. If the income of both types of 
households is taxed at the same rate, subsidizing commuting expenses presents itself 
as a way of securing equal utility. 
In contrast to this, Proposition 2 provides an indisputable efficiency argument for 
taxing commuting. There is no equal utility constraint and the analysis relies on a   12
representative household. No reference is made to external effects of commuting. The 
result is one of optimal taxation in a second-best framework.
4 
 
4. Neutral deductions 
Deductions can be neither efficient nor inefficient. They can be neutral in a second-
best sense of efficiency. In other words, their effect is limited to redistribution in favor 
of those individuals claiming these deductions. It is argued that expenses for 
housework in general and child-care expenses in particular provide typical examples. 
This needs to be explained. 
Consider a skilled individual who can earn income in the market only if somebody else 
does the job at home. That means that the labor supply of the skilled individual S must 
be matched by a housekeeper’s labor supply H. Assume that skilled labor earns 
S S F w =  and causes disutility, V(S), while the person doing housework, is paid  H w  
and suffers disutility  ) (H VH . In equilibrium  H w  has to adjust so that the demand for 
housework S balances its supply H. Now assume that all wage income is taxed and that 
the expenses for housework are deductible at the rate a. Thus the skilled individual 
will solve 
 max  { ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( S V S w at w t H S − − − − }   in  S        ( 1 0 )  
while the housekeeper maximizes  ) ( ) 1 ( H V H w t H H − − . Note that the only real cost of 
employing a housekeeper is  ) (H VH  while  S wH  is a pecuniary cost. After equating S 
                                              
4 The relevance of Proposition 2 is not restricted to commuting. Another delicate application is provided by the 
German practice to allow professors to deduct expenses for a home office from wage income. It is not easy to 
make a strong case for the assumption that professors’ productivity is enhanced if they are allowed to work at   13
with H and after substituting  S F  for  S w  and  ' H V  for  H w t) 1 ( −  the first-order condition 
to (10) can be written as 
  ' '
1
1
) 1 ( V V
t
at
F t H S =
−
−
− −   .         ( 1 1 )  
A benevolent tax planner will maximize social surplus, 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( S V S V S F H − −          ( 1 2 )  
in  a t S , ,  subject to the behavioral constraint (11) and the tax revenue constraint, 
  ] '
1
1






+     =    constant.        (13) 









 in brackets is obtained when netting the tax  S twH  paid by the 
employee with the subsidy  S atwH  given to the employer. It is straightforward to 
demonstrate that t and a are jointly undetermined in the second-best optimum. 
 
Proposition 3: Deducting expenses for housework from taxable income has no effect 
on second-best efficiency as these expenses are pecuniary costs only.  
 
For understanding the result set  ] / ) 1 ( 1 [ ] / '
1
1
1 [ S H S H w w a t F V
t
a
t − + =
−
−
+ ≡ τ  . Interpret 
τ  as the effective tax rate on skilled labor supply. The tax planner’s problem can be 
restated equivalently in terms of τ  instead of  a t, . The tax planner maximizes (12) in 
S , τ  subject to 
                                                                                                                                             
home even if they have an office at university. Only if this assumption were correct, one could justify the   14
  ' ' ) 1 ( H S V V F + = −τ           ( 1 1 ’ )  
and  S SF τ     =     c o n s t a n t .             ( 1 3 ’ )  
Note that there is no true scope for optimization as the necessary degree of freedom is 










+ ≡ τ , evaluated at the optimal value of  H S = , is a solution to the 
original problem (11) – (13). Hence t and a are indeterminate in the optimum. The 
economic interpretation is straightforward. By assumption, skilled labor supply has to 
be matched by a housekeeper’s service. Hence  ] / ) 1 ( 1 [ S H w w a t − + = τ  is the effective 
tax on skilled labor supply. If a is increased and if this increase is compensated by an 
increase in t so that τ  keeps constant, there is no reason why the skilled taxpayer 
should change labor supply. With S fixed the matching labor supply, H, of the 
housekeeper is fixed as well and independent of the nominal tax rate t. Any increase in 
t induces a perfectly compensating increase in  H w . 
As mentioned before Proposition 3 contrasts with conventional textbook wisdom. It is 
fairly standard to argue that tax deductions for child-care expenses enhance labor-
market efficiency. Stiglitz (1986, p. 435) is just a prominent example. However, when 
looked at from a labor market perspective, child care is just a specific form of 
housework. Hence Proposition 3 allows one to challenge the efficiency enhancing 
effect of child-care expenses. If one still likes to make a case for deduction one has to 
search for other reasons. 
                                                                                                                                             
deduction of expenses incurred by a home office.   15
A strong argument is equity. In fact, taxing parents at a rate that effectively exceeds 
the rate applied to persons without dependent children is difficult to reconcile with the 
ability-to-pay principle. Note that by definition τ  exceeds t if child-care expenses are 
less than fully deductible, a<1. Setting τ >t clearly distorts consumption efficiency. 
The distutility of labor comes to differ between individuals with and without children. 
Equally, V’ and 
'
H V , need not be equated in the optimum. However, consumption 
efficiency is nothing that is required by second-best efficiency. 
Proposition 3 assumes that the skilled individual cannot choose between employing a 
housekeeper or not. If some scope of choice is assumed to exist, the choice of a raises 
some broader policy issues. First one has to acknowledge that a housekeeper will only 
be employed if this provides utility to the employer. If this is assumed to hold, tax 
policy has to take account of the effect that the choice of a may have on the efficiency 
of consumption. Two further issues arise if there is unemployment in the labor market 
or if the development of children is considered to suffer from insufficient care. 
Allowing deductibility of  S awH  is a way of coping with unemployment, particularly 
among unskilled labor. With regard to child care, deductibility is a way of 
internalizing the negative effect of insufficient care to children. However, allowing 
S awH  to be deductible is not the only means to cope with such problems and there 
will be more targeted policies. Deductibility is a policy instrument that deserves to be 
considered in this context but that presumably ensures third-best solutions only. 
One might speculate that deduction of child-care expenses is needed to secure an 
efficient fertility choice. If the effective tax on labor supply τ  increases as the result of 
childbearing, fertility incentives are clearly weakened. Still the question is whether   16
allowing the deduction of child-care expenses is a way of enhancing second-best 
efficiency. The question is structurally related to asking for the efficiency effect that 
the deduction of expenses for housework has on occupational choice. Just as deduction 
seems to be needed to secure efficient fertility choices one might speculate that 
deduction is needed to secure efficient occupational choices. In the next two sections 
the efficiency enhancing effect of deduction on occupational choice will be called into 
question. 
 
5. Ambiguous deductions 
Keep the setup as introduced in Section 4 and allow the skilled individual to engage in 
two parallel activities S and L. Just as before, the supply of S requires the time 
matching employment of a housekeeper whereas the supply of ordinary labor L does 
not do so. Let  L w  denote the wage rate paid to ordinary labor. In this setting the skilled 
taxpayer will solve 
 max{ ) ( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( L S V L w t S w at w t L H S + − − + − − − }  in  S, L .    (14) 
The decision problem (14) models a scenario in which an activity requiring the time 
matching service of a housekeeper is substituted by another activity which does not 
require a housekeeper. Such a scenario can be interpreted as a kind of occupational 
choice. The choice is a gradual one which allows the taxpayer to engage in two 
different activities simultaneously. In contrast to this, zero-one decisions are modeled 
in Section 6 below. The housekeeper is assumed to maximize  ) ( ) 1 ( H V H w t H H − −  just   17
as before. After equating S with H and after substituting  L S F F ,  for  L S w w ,  and  ' H V  for 
H w t) 1 ( −  the first-order conditions of (14) can be written as 
  ) ( ' ) ( '
1
1
) 1 ( L S V S V
t
at
F t H S + =
−
−
− −   ,      (15) 
) ( ' ) 1 ( L S V F t L + = −   .          ( 1 6 )  
A benevolent tax planner will maximize social surplus, 
  ) ( ) ( S V L S V F H − + −          ( 1 7 )  
in  a t L S , , ,  subject to the behavioral constraints (15), (16) and the tax revenue 
constraint, 
  ] '
1
1






+  +  L tLF  =  constant .            (18) 
One easily derives the following result (see Appendix). 
 
Proposition 4: Let the returns to scale of F be constant in L, S. Efficient taxation 
requires to balance relative tax wedges according to the rule   

















V V F H
L
H S   .     (19) 
 
(19) has some strong and some weak policy implication. The strong one says that the 
effective tax wedge on skilled labor,  ' ' V V F F H S S − − = τ , should exceed the tax wedge 
on ordinary labor,  ' V F tF L L − = . This is a strong implication as it does not rely on 
equity. It only relies on tax efficiency in a second-best framework. Clearly, one would   18
like to know what (19) means for τ  relative to t or for the efficient choice of a. 
Unfortunately little can be said without making more specific assumptions. Hence (19) 
does not allow us to derive a definite result with respect to a.  1 < ⇔ > a t τ  is just as 
compatible with (19) as is  1 ≥ ⇔ ≤ a t τ . It is in this sense that allowing deduction of 
S wH  is said to have an ambiguous effect on tax efficiency. This is the weak part of 
Proposition 4. The reason for lacking ambiguity is that production and consumption 
efficiency are not separable in the present model variant. First-best efficiency requires 
instead the equality of  ' H S V F −  and  L F . This equality stresses the hybrid character of 
' H V . For skilled labor it is a cost of production and for the housekeeping it is a cost of 
consumption. (19) implies that in the second-best optimum the net return to skilled 
labor,  ' H S V F − , should exceed the net return to ordinary labor,  L F . Equalizing 
marginal products of labor,  L S F F = , would definitely be not efficient. 
For later reference consider a policy regime in which skilled labor is not allowed to 
deduct any work-related expenses. In contrast, firms are allowed to deduct expenses 
incurred by their employees as cost of business. Assume furthermore that policy 
restricts the scope of deduction to some share a of the employees’ expenses  S wH . In 
such a regime firms would maximize  S aw w L w F H S L ) ( + − −  while skilled labor 
maximizes  ) ( ) 1 ( ] )[ 1 ( L S V S w a L w S w t H L S + − − − + − . Given constant returns to scale 
the problem of choosing a and t efficiently turns out to be structurally equivalent to the 
earlier one. Hence in the optimum condition (19) has to hold again. This demonstrates 
that the ambiguous efficiency effect of allowing deduction of  S wH  is not removed by 
just denying deduction and by allowing firms to refund wage-related expenses. 
   19
Corollary 3: Denying employees to deduct expenses  S wH  and allowing employers to 
deduct these expenses instead does not remove the ambiguous effect on tax 
efficiency. 
 
6. Deductibility and choice of occupation 
Stick to the model as introduced in Section 4 and extend it to allow for occupational 
choice as a zero-one decision. This requires the distribution of taxpayers working in 
different occupations to be endogenous. Let N denote the number of housekeepers and 
1-N the number of taxpayers employing a housekeeper. Market clearing requires 
  S N NH ) 1 ( − =   .             ( 2 0 )  
Occupational choice is in equilibrium if housekeepers yield the same level of utility as 
the taxpayers employing housekeepers, 
  ) ( ) 1 ( H V H w t H H − −    =   ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 [( S V S w at F t H S − − − −   .    (21) 
Consider the tax planner’s problem. By maximizing the utility of one type of 
household the utility of the other type is maximized as well. Without loss of generality 
let us assume that the tax planner maximizes the utility of housekeepers, 
) ( ) 1 ( H V H w t H H − − . The constraints are (20), (21), the first-order conditions to the 
left and right-hand sides of (21) and the tax revenue constraint, 
  H Ntw aw F tS N H H S + − − ] [ ) 1 (   =  constant.          (22) 
The control variables are  N w H S t a H, , , , , . It is shown in the Appendix that t and a are 
jointly undetermined in the second-best optimum.    20
 
Proposition 5: Deducting expenses for housework from income continues to have no 
effect on second-best efficiency if occupational choice is endogenous.  
 
The intuition is similar to the one given for Proposition 3. The labor supply and the 
utility of the taxpayer employing housekeeper services is fully determined by the 





S H S H w w a t F V
t
a
t − + =
−
−
+ ≡ τ . If a is increased and if 
this increase is compensated by an increase in t so that τ  keeps constant, neither labor 
supply nor utility change. Because of (21) the utility of housekeepers does not change 
either. Hence H must stay constant. The increase in t is perfectly compensated by an 
increase in  H w . If  H S,  are optimally chosen, any tax reform that keeps τ  constant 
has no real effects. 
 
7. Deductibility and choice of schooling 
The model as set up in Section 4 is inappropriate to discuss educational expenses. One 
of the features that may give reason to objection is the following. If the model were to 
be given an educational interpretation, the housekeeper would have to be interpreted as 
a teacher. An unpleasant implication, though a minor one, were that one would have to 
abstract from the fact that teachers have to be educated, too. This may however be 
considered a necessary and acceptable modeling simplification. Definitely not 
acceptable is the implication that the same time S is used by the educated taxpayer 
both for schooling and for providing skilled labor. Hence consider the following   21
adaptation of Section 4’s model. Let S denote the time of schooling, L the supply of 
labor and V(S+L) the disutility derived from doing both. The teacher supplies S 
according to  ) ( ' ) 1 ( S V w t H H = − . Schooling increases labor productivity,  ) (S f wS = , 
with positive but decreasing marginal returns, f’ > 0 > f”. An immediate implication of 
decreasing returns is that schooling generates pure profit which even a wage tax does 
not fully tax away. Instead, pure profit from schooling after wage tax is given by  
] ) ( ' ) ( )[ 1 ( S S Lf S Lf t − − = π  > 0. Let us assume that this pure profit does not accrue to 
the educated taxpayer and that it is fully taxed away instead by a fictitious separate tax. 
The reason for making this assumption is a theoretical one. If there were some pure 
profit accruing to the private sector, optimal choices of t and a could no longer be 
considered to be second-best solutions. Furthermore, the present analysis is to identify 
the effect that deducting educational expenses has on efficiency. Hence any disturbing 
effect from other sources like positive private profits shall be suppressed. Given all 
this, a tax planner will maximize  ) ( ) ( ) ( L S V S V S Lf H + − − in  L t a , ,  and S subject to 
the  behavioral constraints,  
  ) ( ' ) ( '
1
1
) ( ' ) 1 ( L S V S V
t
at
S Lf t H + =
−
−
− −   ,      (23) 
) ( ' ) ( ) 1 ( L S V S f t + = −   ,          ( 2 4 )  
and the tax revenue constraint, 
  S S Lf t S Lf S SV
t
t
a H ) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( '
1
) 1 ( − − +
−
−   =  constant.      (25) 
The first term of (25) is obtained when netting the wage tax paid by the teacher with 
the loss of wage tax induced by deducting educational expenses. The second term is   22
gross labor income and the third is labor income earned by the educated taxpayer net 
of taxes on wage income and on pure profit. One easily shows that t and a are jointly 
indeterminate in the optimum. The proof parallels the one of Proposition 5 and may 
therefore be skipped. 
 
Proposition 6: If all pure profit from schooling is taxed away, deducting educational 
expenses that are pecuniary costs only has no effect on second-best 
efficiency. 
 
Propositions 6 has to be related to the literature that analyzes the optimal taxation of 
human capital accumulation. However, a direct comparison of results is difficult for 
the following reason. The literature is largely one on third-best efficiency. The 
following two causes preventing second-best solutions are typically modeled. One is 
the assumption that pure profit accrues to the educated taxpayer. The other concerns 
the structure of income taxation in a multi-period framework. Thus it is typically 
assumed that cash-flow taxation of human capital is combined with accrual taxation of 
physical capital (Trostel, 1993; Nielsen and Sörensen, 1997; and Milesi-Firetti and 
Roubini, 1998; Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2003). Deducting educational expenses is 
hardly ever questioned in this context. Instead, the general consensus seems to be that 
all educational expenses should be treated like costs of capital investment which 
means that they should be granted deduction (Hope and Miller, 1988; Trostel, 1993; 
Nerlove et al., 1993; Judd, 1998). The fact that it may make a great difference whether 
educational expenses are real or pecuniary costs is only vaguely and non-  23
systematically acknowledged (Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1998). In contrast, the 
present analysis stresses the difference. Only the deduction of real cost is shown to be 
indisputably efficient. The deduction of the educators’ wage bill has been shown to 
have no effect on second-best efficiency if only pure profit of schooling is taxed away. 
If pure profit is not taxed away, it may well be different. Still, intuition suggests that if 
deduction of educational expenses has a positive effect on schooling at all, this will 
increase pure profit from schooling which as such is harmful for tax efficiency. Hence 
it is fair to conclude that the overall efficiency effect of deducting educational 
expenses that are only pecuniary costs is ambiguous. As a result it is by no means clear 
whether tax deductibility of tuition fees can and should be recommended across the 
board. This result may help to rationalize the practice of many countries not to allow 
full deduction of educational expenses. Traditionally such a restrictive policy is 
justified by either equity concerns or by referring to the generous public subsidies 
given to the educational sector anyway. 
 
8. Summarizing and concluding remarks 
According to the various results derived in this paper allowing deduction of work-
related expenses has a strictly positive effect on tax efficiency only if two conditions 
hold jointly: (i) The expenses should be interpretable as real cost and (ii) the expenses 
should be required for increasing taxable income. Both conditions have been assumed 
to hold in Section 2 and it has been shown that full deduction is a necessary means to 
ensure production efficiency given that no pure profit accrues to the private sector. The 
necessity of condition (ii) is suggested by the analysis of commuting expenses in   24
Section 3. There it has been argued that commuting is an example for expenses failing 
to increase taxable income. This is so as employers have no demand for commuting. It 
does not increase their revenues. If that is correct, commuting should even be taxed 
before it is granted tax deduction. Condition (i) is a more subtle one and it has been the 
subject of scrutiny in the remaining Sections 4 to 7. The discussion starts in Section 4 
from the observation that expenses for housework in general and for child care in 
particular are pecuniary costs. It has been shown that allowing deduction for such 
expenses has no real effect on tax efficiency. The deductions are perfectly neutral. In 
Sections 5 and 6 this result has been subjected to a test of robustness by allowing 
taxpayers to make occupational choices. If individuals can choose to become either a 
housekeeper or a skilled taxpayer employing a housekeeper, allowing deduction of 
expenses for housework continues to be neutral with respect to tax efficiency (Section 
6). If individuals can simultaneously engage in two activities one of which requires 
housekeeping services while the other one does not do so, allowing deduction for 
housework has an ambiguous effect on tax efficiency (Section 5). That means that 
little can be said about the efficiency enhancing effect of granting deduction. All one 
can say is that skilled labor should optimally bear more tax than housework. As taxes 
paid are the product of tax rates and wage rates little of some generality can be said 
about the efficient differentiation of effective tax rates or – to state the same thing 
equivalently – about the efficient extent of deduction granted to housekeeping 
expenses. This is so, as in the underlying model production and consumption 
efficiency cannot be separated. For skilled labor the housekeeper’s disutility of labor is 
a cost of production while for housekeeping it is a cost of consumption. Finally, 
Section 7 turned to an analysis of educational expenses. It has been shown that   25
deducting pecuniary costs has no effect on second-best efficiency if only any 
disturbing effect of pure profit from schooling is suppressed. The latter requires, as 
suggested by the production efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees, that the 
pure profit from schooling does not accrue to the private sector. If it does, optimal 
taxation enters the realm of third best and the efficiency effect of deducting 
educational expenses that are pecuniary costs must be questioned. 
If the deduction of wage-related expenses is indisputably efficient only in some rare 
cases, one might conclude that work-related expenses should best be not deductible at 
all. In fact, this is the conclusion drawn by Baldry (1998). It is corroborated by this 
paper’s result that deductions are only efficient if the expenses are required to provide 
special services demanded by employers. Under such circumstances one should 
however expect employers to willingly carry the expenses by themselves. They have 
to pay for the full resource cost of service provision anyway. Hence, if the provision 
requires specific expenses, it should make no great difference whether employers or 
employees pay for them. According to Baldry, denying deductibility to employees 
would have the advantage of eliminating a particular source of inefficiency. This 
inefficiency is caused by the dual use of even those expenses that are required to 
increase taxable income. Typically, they can equally be used for non-occupational, 
private consumption and the government lacks the information to differentiate between 
the two uses. Denying employees the deduction of wage-related expenses would make 
it easier to tax the consumptive ones as required by a policy of tax-cut-cum-base 
broadening.   26
Although Baldry’s proposal has charm it is not without problems. When looked at 
more closely the proposal is not as convincing as it appears at first sight. There are 
three objections that deserve to be well taken. One is raised by collusive behavior of 
employees and employers. If the government is unable to differentiate productive and 
consumptive uses of expenses, little is gained by denying their deductibility to 
employees. Employers could offer to carry the expenses as part of a differentiated pay 
package. That would make the expenses tax deductible. Fringe benefits have to be 
assessed from this perspective. The second objection deserves even more thought. It 
might well conflict with efficient wage contracting if the employers are induced to pay 
for certain wage-related expenses. The cost of human capital investment is an example 
in point. The return to educational costs is not immediate. If the costs are carried by 
the employer, it has the effect of granting a loan to the employee. Employers are 
reluctant to grant loans to employees as it provokes moral-hazard behavior. Hence 
denying employees the deduction of educational costs might evoke an efficiency cost. 
This cost would have to be balanced against the benefit of not subsidizing 
consumptive expenses. This shows that the policy of allowing efficient tax deductions 
raises non-trivial questions once informational issues are taken seriously. Studying 
their effect on efficient taxation is beyond the scope of the present paper.
5 This paper 
however allows one to criticize Baldry’s proposal along a third line. The dual use of 
wage-related expenses is not the only problem which has to be addressed when 
allowing deduction. As has been stressed repeatedly, expenses should pass some tests 
if their deductibility is to be indisputably efficient. One stated test has been that the 
expenses are interpretable as real cost. The efficiency effect of deducting pecuniary 
                                              
5 For a first promising attempt see Baake et al. (2004).   27
costs may well be ambiguous (Section 5). It then does not help just to deny employees 
to deduct wage-related expenses. Policy would have to lay down to what extent 
employers should be allowed to refund these wage-related expenses and to treat the 
refunds as cost of business. It has been shown by Corollary 3 that this policy problem 
is structurally equivalent to the one of fixing the extent by which employees are 
allowed to deduct wage-related expenses. Hence Baldry’s proposal would not help to 
simplify the tax planner’s problem. 
 
9. Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Let  λ , σ  and γ  be the Lagrangean factors associated to  ' ) 1 ( V F t L = − , the second 
behavioral constraint in (2) and the tax revenue constraint (4), respectively. Partial 
differentiation with respect to a yields  S γ σ =  and differentiation with respect to t 
yields  L γ λ =  . By differentiating with respect to L and substituting  ' V FL −  for  L tF  
one obtains 
  ) ' )( 1 ( V FL − +γ   =   )] ( " ) [( SL LL SF LF V S L + − + γ  
            =   ] ' [ )] ( ' [ L S L V SF LF F
dL
d
V Π ν γ ν γ + = − − +  . 
By symmetry, partial differentiation with respect to S yields 
  ) ' )( 1 ( V c FS − − +γ   =   ] ' [ S V Π ν γ +  . 
Dividing through proves Proposition 1. 
 
The Proof of Proposition 2 follows along the same lines as the one of Proposition 1. 
By taking the partial derivatives with respect to  L t a , ,  one ends up with the condition 
  ) ' )( 1 ( V FL − +γ   =   ] " ) [( LL LF V S L − + γ    28
from which positivity of  ) 1 /( γ γ +  can be inferred. By differentiating with respect to D 
and substituting  –atc  for  H’–c–V’  one obtains 
  atc  =   ] " " ) [(
1






Proposition 2 follows after signing the right-hand side.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Let σ , λ  and γ  be the Lagrangean factors associated to (15), 
(16) and (18), respectively. Partial differentiation with respect to a yields  S γ σ =  and 
differentiation with respect to t yields  L γ λ =  . By differentiating with respect to L and 
substituting  ' V FL −  for  L tF  one obtains 
  ) ' )( 1 ( V FL − +γ   =   " ) ( V S L + γ  . 
Use has been made of constant returns to scale. By symmetry, partial differentiation 
with respect to S yields 
  ) ' ' )( 1 ( V V F H S − − +γ   =   ] " " ) [( H SV V S L + + γ  . 
Dividing through proves Proposition 4. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Maximize  ) ( ) ( ' H V H HV H H −  in  N H S t a , , , ,  subject to (11), 
(20), (21), and (22) after substituting  H w t) 1 ( −  by  ) ( ' H VH . Let  µ λ,  and γ  be the 
Lagrangean factors associated to (11), (21) and (22), respectively. Partial 
differentiation with respect to a yields  ] ) 1 ( [ γ µ λ N − + = . Making use of this equality 
and taking the partial derivative with respect to t we end up with 
0 ] ) 1 ( [ = − − S N NH γ . Because of (20), t is indeterminate in the optimum. 
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